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ABSTRACT 
Situation reports, or sitreps, are documents commonly used 
by UN agencies and humanitarian NGOs involved in 
emergency response to disseminate information to and from 
relief workers in the field. This paper analyzes the 
information labor involved in producing sitreps, and how it 
can be used to understand why these documents are 
described by insiders as “fundamentally confused.” 
Drawing from document analysis and interviews with over 
one hundred people involved with sitreps, we examine 
humanitarian information labor in a decentralized, 
hierarchical, collaborative, political, and competitive work 
environment. From an empirical perspective, we contribute 
to CSCW by adding a case study about the situated practice 
of making humanitarian information, which includes our 
work as researcher/consultants in reconstructing the details 
of information gathering and sharing processes in order to 
improve them. We consider how the work of producing 
humanitarian information reproduces problematic 
humanitarian logics.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Humanitarian intervention relies on people making 
decisions about a crisis on the basis of what they learn from 
actors on the ground, often in faraway places. One of the 
several inputs in this decision-making process are situation 
reports, or sitreps, documents commonly used by UN 
agencies, especially the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), as well as humanitarian 
NGOs and other organizations involved in emergency 
response, to disseminate information to/from relief workers 
in the field. These documents may contain qualitative and 
numerical descriptions of the situation, and cover a broad 
range of topics, including security issues, analyses of the 
humanitarian situation and political context, reports of 
damage to the local population and physical infrastructure, 
program planning and progress information, advocacy and 
media issues, etc. NGO sitreps are typically confidential 
documents meant for internal use, but OCHA sitreps are 
public, circulated as printed documents in the field, via 
email, and on humanitarian emergency websites such as 
OCHA-funded ReliefWeb.int. Conditions during 
humanitarian emergencies typically make data collection 
very difficult; sitreps are subjected to widely varying and at 
times contradicting expectations from the various groups of 
people who read them. Despite these challenges, sitreps are 
supposed to achieve a great deal for various humanitarian 
actors: they are supposed to help donors understand how to 
spend their money, and to inform humanitarian workers at 
the site of crisis about the work of others. To quote one of 
our project informants, “The sitreps are a fundamentally 
confused document.” 
This paper is based on a case study of OCHA’s production 
of situation reports to document humanitarian crises in 
2008-2009. At that time, OCHA’s primary role was to 
coordinate the multitude of humanitarian response actors, 
and one of its activities was to create a number of 
“information products” about disasters, including situation 
reports. Here, we analyze the “information labor” [20–23] 
that goes into such documents, which is often overlooked 
even as the necessity of having high quality information 
about crises is recognized by all participants as a priority. 
As we will show, though sitreps are valued documents, the 
work of making sitreps is not. The (sometimes) ease of the 
global circulation of humanitarian information obscures 
how difficult it is to produce, but this “contradiction is just 
the point” [23]. The information labor analytic is useful for 
revealing the power relations involved in creating sitreps 
and demonstrates that they reflect complex and 
contradictory situations, and fundamentally irreconcilable 
goals. Although our research was conducted in 2008 and 
2009, and both the sitrep document and OCHA have 
changed since then, our analysis of this near history has 
theoretical implications that are more enduring: that 
humanitarian information labor is situated in a particular 
institutional context where the humanitarian information 
produced about a crisis cannot be separated from the 
political-economic relations in which the production took 
place. 
The rest of this paper continues with a brief overview of 
related work in CSCW. We then give a synopsis of our 
methods and research limitations. We put forth several 
ideal-typical scenarios that describe how our study 
collaborators described the sitrep production process. We 
discuss six elements of humanitarian information labor and 
show how it shaped the production of sitrep documents: the 
multiple audiences for the sitrep; the difficulty of making 
information about a disaster; what people who work on 
sitreps think about the work; the hierarchical and distributed 
organization of OCHA; the relations amongst international 
humanitarian actors collaborating on crisis response and 
competing for funding; and the logic of humanitarian 
intervention. We finally discuss in detail the idea of 
“information labor” and how it shapes sitreps.  
RELATED LITERATURE 
We situate our work within the scholarship on the 
information practices of those involved with humanitarian 
action. In the CSCW community, researchers have 
highlighted computer-supported distributed crisis response 
work by the people affected by a disaster and survivors of 
war [35,36,52,53,55], digital online volunteers [15,44,56–
58], and the use of digital communications in crises by 
professional responders [25,50]. Early CSCW papers about 
crisis informatics focused on how those affected by a 
disaster make use of ICTs in innovative ways as they make 
sense of what has happened [55], and engage in information 
verification [35,52]. Many early studies about the use of 
social media by those affected by a crisis have been about 
US disasters such as shootings [45,46].  
The focus of this paper is on the collaborative work of 
humanitarian response professionals to produce 
humanitarian information in an international context. 
Although, as we will argue below, the specific institutional 
context of humanitarian work is crucial for understanding 
the information produced, our work speaks to some of the 
themes developed by CSCW researchers who examine 
information-related work in complex human-service 
oriented (mostly non-profit) organizational environments. 
Much of this work is focused on access to and adoption of 
particular ICTs [19], rather than the production of 
information. Still, many projects note the importance of 
coordination amongst multiple organizations in non-profit 
settings [69], though importantly these collaborations often 
take place amongst organizations competing for funding 
[17]. In addition to a resource-poor work environment, 
different organizational structures shape intra- and inter-
organizational information sharing [18]. Stoll et al describe 
competition and collaboration in an networked multi-
organization environment fighting human trafficking [61].  
Though inter-organizational coordination was necessary, it 
was challenging because of the instability of the other 
organizations involved, adherence to different 
“collaboration modes” in different organizations, and 
concerns about perceptions of donors, called “saving face” 
[61]. Relatedly, recent work about Electronic Medical 
Records finds that they are inscribed with “institutional 
logics” and the differing documentary goals of coordination 
and accountability are impossible [45]. 
Recent scholarship on international humanitarian action and 
disaster response has focused on volunteer-driven online 
efforts [15,56–58]. For example, Starbird and Palen 
describe the “Humanity Road” project, where a group of 
volunteers organize online to process digital information 
about a disaster [58]. Their practice is augmented by a 
variety of digital tools to sort Tweets and coordinate online 
volunteer activities. Through transparency and intense 
reflection on processes, these volunteers attempt to produce 
trustworthy information to impact action “on the ground.” 
The volunteers even adopted the term “sitrep” to describe 
one product of their work to legitimize it and make it more 
visible to the professional humanitarian responders. 
However, the authors note that it is not clear what impact, if 
any, that this work has on the world of professional 
humanitarian emergency response at the site of crisis.  
Social media such as Twitter are potentially useful to 
professional disaster response activity [43], but other forms 
social media are already influential amongst professional 
disaster responders. Open Street Map (OSM), annotated by 
volunteers, is being used by humanitarian workers in the 
context of relief work [44]. However, these tools are not 
without complications. Geographers have examined how 
the work of OSM mapping is biased [60]. OSM tools 
sometimes capture controversies, but other times do not 
[44]. The work of the digital volunteers with OSM also 
points to some of the challenges of virtual disaster response 
noted by media studies scholar Chouliaraki: the work of 
faraway volunteers sometimes imposes particular readings 
of an event that those who live there do not possess [13,14].  
While much of the CSCW literature has focused on the 
information practices of non-professional international 
crisis responders, Goggins et al have looked at online 
information sharing practices inside the “walled garden” 
[25] of professional disaster response institutional networks 
of government and NGOs. Like sitreps, these private 
information sharing platforms represent the views of 
professional humanitarian actors. Goggins et al [25] 
highlight the work of the “invisible broker” who “connect 
two networks of activity within APAN [All-Partners Access 
Network, the platform being analyzed], but is not 
identifiable from raw post activity.”  Similarly, we seek to 
highlight  “invisible” information work involved in making 
sitreps.  
Moving outside of the realm of CSCW literature, recent 
work in the realm of international humanitarian emergency 
response is useful to understanding the collaborative work 
and expertise involved in sitrep production. The resources 
dedicated to humanitarian action have recently increased 
[1], and along with them a critique of humanitarian work, 
from academics [e.g. 1,2,10,11,27,71], humanitarian 
practitioners [e. g. 34,66], and the press [e. g. 26,29,47,49]. 
These critics decry the compromises with corrupt 
governments in order to access affected populations, ask 
how much money actually reaches the intended recipients 
versus the humanitarian organizations, question the long 
term effects of aid on developing economies, and 
acknowledge the competition for humanitarian funding. 
Furthermore, humanitarian action is supposed to be 
“distinct from several other projects,” such as economic 
development and the promotion of democracy because 
humanitarian emergencies “pose immediate moral demands 
that override other considerations,” though it is in fact often 
intertwined with a state’s international policy, and even an 
instrument of it [11]. Other critiques of humanitarian 
activity note that donations for international emergencies 
are often guided most obviously by the number of people 
killed, but also by colonial relations, language, proximity to 
a disaster, and the amount of news coverage, not simply the 
needs of the affected populations [62].  
In this work, we move beyond the general critiques of 
humanitarian intervention to examine humanitarian 
information production. Specifically, we examine how the 
issues identified in the critiques of humanitarian 
intervention shape information labor. We borrow Greg 
Downey’s term information labor [5,20–23] to refer to the 
work of OCHA situation report document production. 
Downey, a geographer and historian, examines the labor of 
managing, consuming, and producing and reproducing what 
he calls “internetworks” [20], or infrastructures for 
circulating information. Downey’s analysis highlights 
“invisible” information labor behind the telegram message 
delivery [21,59] and closed captioning systems [22]. The 
concept of information labor seeks to make visible the work 
that makes possible the circulation of information across 
vast contexts [23]. Furthermore, a close examination of the 
contradictions in humanitarian information labor help us 
understand why the sitrep is a “fundamentally confused” 
document. Downey argues that focusing on “information 
labor” means highlighting the political economic context, 
the social meaning of information labor, and how the global 
circulation of information shapes work [23]. The work of 
producing sitreps is not exclusively focused on the process 
of circulating information, but it is about producing 
information about complex crises that is legible to the 
cosmopolitan audience of humanitarian actors. We take 
information labor to include the work of gathering 
information to include in a sitrep from other humanitarian 
actors and distilling it into an “information product” to be 
circulated outside of OCHA. 
We also highlight the obstacles that information finds in 
circulating, in the tradition of “critical information studies” 
[68]. In studies of disasters, researchers argue that 
“information flow is the central nervous system for all 
disaster relief efforts” [30]. Information is a useful concept 
precisely because it resembles what Latour calls an 
“immutable mobile”—an entity that can move from one 
context to another keeping its original properties. However, 
we argue that information might not have the mobility it is 
assumed to have. The immutable mobile “information” 
retains its meaning regardless of context, a sentiment well 
captured by the powerful metaphor “information flow” 
[12,72], whereby information can cross social, political, and 
physical distances,. The materiality of digital documents 
that can be easily reproduced and conjured on devices all 
over the world makes the imagination of flow easier [4,24]. 
However, “Information doesn’t suddenly flow out of the 
categories and classification it is contained in, nor does it 
jump from one technological platform to another all by 
itself” [28]. The assumption that information can flow 
conceals ideological work. Saxenian [51] and Tekhteyev’s 
[64] work on knowledge circulation describes the work that 
has to be done to move “information” from one place to 
another. Changing what people know, however, is not just a 
matter of information technology, or even “information” as 
an “immutable mobile.” Still, the potential of information 
flow is enticing, and many projects have tried to build 
software to improve information flow on the assumption 
that if bits flow, knowledge also flows. By focusing on 
information labor, contextualized in relations of production, 
we show that information does not just easily flow, but is 
painstakingly produced and processed. 
Using the lens of “information labor” and “critical 
information studies” to examine a case of crisis informatics 
highlights different aspects of collaborative work. Our work 
extends existing CSCW crisis informatics literature by 
showing how the conditions of information production are 
not only embedded in humanitarian information about 
humanitarian crisis, but critical for understanding it. The 
challenges involved in making information about disasters 
that we identify in this article builds on recent work critical 
of the new tools, epistemologies and practices involved in 
using “Big Data” for “digital humanitarianism” [8,9,16,54].  
While circulating information about humanitarian crisis can 
be straightforward, at least for people with working internet 
connections, we show how the interpretation and 
management of this information must consider the 
information labor involved in producing it.  
BACKGROUND 
Beginning in the early 2000s, OCHA stepped up its efforts 
to become an “intellectual leader and knowledge broker 
among the international humanitarian community” [39–42]. 
Part of this effort consisted in creating a portfolio of 
documents that included situation reports. Our engagement 
with the organization began in 2008, following an 
information management review that identified sitreps as an 
opportunity to improve OCHA’s management of 
humanitarian emergencies. 
Between 2008 and 2009, a team comprising the authors, 
Nick Rabinowitz, and John Ward worked with a manager in 
the OCHA information unit to analyze sitreps and suggest 
ways to improve both the document and the processes of 
information gathering and sharing around it. As researchers, 
we were interested in broad questions about disaster 
information: how are sitreps created and circulated? As 
consultants, a normative goal motivated our inquiry: how 
could we improve the process of information gathering and 
sharing around sitreps? Our ultimate goal was to build an 
information system to support data sharing and 
collaboration amongst various humanitarian actors. In 
retrospect, this seems naïve, but it is important to state our 
initial assumptions. At the end, the major output of the 
consultative part of this project was a Word template for 
sitreps, which was adopted in some emergencies, as well as 
recommendations on how to differentiate sitreps from other 
information products, and how to streamline their 
distribution.  
In our role as consultants, the sometimes-used document 
template we produced was a highly unsatisfying result 
given what we had set out to do; but our real role was to 
“structure complex messes” [70]. In this paper, we step 
back into our researcher roles, and drop the normative goals 
of “improving sitreps” in order to reflect on the work of 
making humanitarian information. Nonetheless, our 
normative goals as consultants shaped the interviews, our 
analysis, and interactions.  
Method 
In the course of the project, we spoke to over one hundred 
people in one-on-one interviews, group interviews, and 
roundtables. We conducted individual and group interviews 
over the phone and in person at OCHA headquarters in 
New York, Geneva, and to a field office over a year and a 
half in 2008 and 2009. In this article, interviewees are 
anonymous and identified with the type of organization 
they work for: OCHA; UN Agency (e.g. UNHCR, 
UNICEF, WFP, etc.); NGO; and Donor. All of the 
interviews had at least one interviewer and one note-taker 
present, but not all were recorded. After each interview, we 
did extensive debriefings with team members who weren’t 
present at interviews, and triangulated our notes, especially 
when we did not use a tape recorder.  
In order to better understand the insights that emerged from 
the interviews, and to see if we could substantiate (or not) 
some of the practical assertions that came up around sitreps, 
we analyzed a corpus of 101 documents, representing all 
the OCHA situation reports sent out by OCHA’s website 
ReliefWeb between March 18 and April 25, 2008. For each 
document, we recorded the issuing office, the date on the 
sitrep (which at times was different from the date when the 
document was issued), the number of days covered, if 
specified, how the document was named. Two people 
looked at different dimensions of the documents, and 
classified them according to their content. 
Most, though not all, of our interviews were facilitated by 
several people in OCHA offices in New York and Geneva 
who work in information management. The other 
interviewees were with humanitarian actors in the 
researchers’ professional networks. The choice of 
interviewees was designed to give us a broad view of 
sitreps. We talked to those who wrote, read, were expected 
to read, or contributed to situation reports. Most of the 
interviewees were introduced to us by OCHA officers, and 
would not have spoken to us without this introduction. This 
clearly introduced a selection bias in our sample. 
Furthermore, because of our collaboration with information 
management professionals who worked at OCHA 
headquarters, many people thought of us as members of 
OCHA though we did our best to reiterate we were not. 
While we tried to triangulate what we learned from our 
interviewees through, for example, the sitrep documents 
themselves, as well as public reports published by a number 
of the organizations involved with this study, these 
limitations need to be acknowledged. One other issue needs 
to be highlighted: while one of the major drivers of the 
project to improve sitreps was to see the results of 
humanitarian aid helping the survivors of crisis, those who 
were the recipients of humanitarian aid do not have an 
explicit voice in the sitrep and are also absent here.  
In the next section, we briefly outline the process that 
produced the document as we reconstructed it from our 
fieldwork.  
IDEALIZED SITREP PRODUCTION 
There were a number of different ways that a sitrep might 
come into existence. In a country with a UN OCHA office 
in place (typically places with protracted humanitarian 
emergencies like wars), there were people in the country 
who wrote sitreps, usually an Information Management 
Officer (IMO). Sitrep documents were shared by field 
teams to field offices to country office, and then on to the 
regional and/or global headquarters. Often, sitreps were 
“cleared” by the head of country team and possibly by 
headquarters in Geneva and New York. Clearing a sitrep 
involved OCHA management reading sitreps for form and 
quality to ensure it was well-written and conformed to the 
goals of OCHA to coordinate emergency interventions. 
Public sitreps like OCHA’s depended heavily on the 
information that sitrep authors collected from other 
humanitarian actors in the field, particularly from the large 
International NGOs and UN Agencies with whom they 
collaborated. Much of the significant communication in the 
field was verbal. Within an organization, staff members 
shared updates about the emergencies in general meetings. 
Between organizations, staff shared information during 
OCHA coordination meetings. Humanitarian response 
workers also all had their own personal networks of 
collaborators and friends that transcended organizational 
boundaries. 
From our interviews, we reconstructed a few generalized 
scenarios that illustrate how an Information Officer might 
make a sitrep. The first is when OCHA has a solid 
infrastructure in place, typically in countries with complex, 
long-running emergencies (See figure 1).  
 
 
Fig. 1 – Information gathering in countries with an OCHA 
has a staffed country office in place at the time of an 
earthquake. A stable network of informants and/or sub-
offices constantly feeds information to the main country 
office, which sometimes collects it into databases. The 
office has sufficient manpower to analyze it, provide 
cumulative data, and be ready for sudden emergencies.  
Given that it is easier to do well in an emergency what is 
already done well in regular situations, countries with a 
stable OCHA office were often the best prepared to make 
sitreps in extraordinary circumstances, because they had the 
large network of other humanitarian actors necessary to 
gather content for sitreps already in place. 
In the second scenario, OCHA did not already have a 
country office at the time of a disaster (though often a 
“Regional” office might have personnel monitoring a given 
country). OCHA Desk Officers in Geneva or New York 
might work with groups of people in the region over email 
to make the sitrep. They would augment reports from their 
contacts with public documents from other organizations 
available on ReliefWeb, a public website funded by OCHA 
which posts humanitarian information from many 
organizations. They would also use, if available, reports 
from UNDAC, the United Nation Disaster Assessment and 
Coordination, a group which is mobilized to disaster-struck 
countries within a day of the disaster to assess what has 
happened. This is a description by a Desk Officer at 
headquarters who had to put together sitreps for a 
“medium” sized flood in a country with no OCHA 
presence: 
“I created virtual task force with email. Talking with 
regional office, and Geneva…. I rely on info from the 
regional office. Do my search on ReliefWeb. Cut and paste 
from there… When we have an UNDAC team, the meat of 
the report comes from the UNDAC team.” (OCHA) 
These are simplified models of two modalities of 
information gathering, illustrated in Figures 2 and 3:  
 
 
Fig. 2 – Information gathering in countries without an 
OCHA infrastructure in place 
 
 
Fig. 3 – Assessment by the UNDAC Team  
These models represent how sitrep authors presented their 
interactions with other organizations within OCHA and the 
UN in the process of creating a sitrep. The sitrep writers 
were often confused about how to proceed on “new” crises, 
especially those who were thrown into the process without 
a clear idea of the various hierarchies at play. That these 
models are not always consistent and even confusing is 
indicative of the complexity of the world in which sitrep 
authors worked, something we dive into below. 
CHALLENGES IN SITREP PRODUCTION 
The idealized version of sitrep production embodies the 
illusion of information circulating freely, and all actors 
working towards the same goal of achieving an objective 
description of the emergency and what is needed to address 
it. The reality is different: information for sitreps has to 
come from diverse actors who do not always have an 
incentive to share it. It has to be put together by people who 
are trying to serve different and at times incompatible 
audiences. It passes through many different offices, each 
adding or deleting according to what they believe are the 
priorities the document should address. It is a public 
document, rather than an internal one, and thus a document 
of compromise that embodies the politics of the emergency. 
Furthermore, gathering information about humanitarian 
crises is often an impossible task. For example, to 
categorize and count [37] the number of Internally 
Displaced People in a massive humanitarian emergency 
requires a significant effort by highly skilled professionals, 
and even in the best of cases will result in wide 
approximations. 
Here we present six complications in the process of making 
sitreps: first, the multiplicity of sitrep audiences; second, 
the hierarchical and distributed organization of OCHA; 
third, the status of sitrep work; fourth, the unique 
humanitarian interventionist logic where “neutrality is the 
basis for access,” (Calhoun 2010: 51); fifth, the challenge 
of making information about a complicated situation; and 
sixth, the competition and cooperation amongst 
humanitarian actors with regards to information sharing. 
1st Challenge: The multiple sitrep audiences 
Sitrep authors thought that the document readers included 
humanitarian actors “in the field” (at the site of a crisis), the 
managers of humanitarian organizations in New York and 
Geneva, members organizations who donated to 
humanitarian response, the governments at the site of the 
humanitarian emergency and abroad. Each group thus 
required different details for sitreps to be useful.  
The first audience were humanitarian actors who were 
working physically close to the crisis. They were assumed 
to be interested in details that enabled what our informants 
called “operations” or “coordination” of humanitarian 
action at the site of the emergency. However, most 
humanitarian actors working at the site of a crisis did not 
find sitreps useful for operation or coordination. For these 
people, the main way to share information were meetings 
and personal contacts. In the words of an OCHA senior 
manager, “Program staff in big NGOs sit at the same table 
and already talk about coordination; by the time an OCHA 
sitrep is being written, tents are already going somewhere.” 
(OCHA).  
Another audience was people in OCHA or the UN at 
headquarters in New York or Geneva who wanted to learn 
about long-term trends or compare across emergencies for 
the purpose of resource allocation. These readers did not 
find sitreps to be useful for these tasks because they did not 
always give data that would allow comparison. For 
example, one sitrep might give the number of people in 
need of educational resources in a refugee camp, while the 
other sitrep provided no details. 
A third audience that sitrep writers cited were the donors, 
assumed to be interested in the needs of beneficiaries. Some 
donors saw sitreps as one useful data point in many, but 
these donors were often not those with access to large 
resources. Interviews revealed that donors with large 
resources at their disposal (USAID, ECHO and DFID) had 
their own network of people they called upon to get the 
information they needed. One donor explained,  
“We never allocate money on basis of OCHA sitreps; the 
information must be triangulated. It can point you in the 
right direction, it’s part of the picture” (Donor).  
These major donors “in the field” often did not even look at 
OCHA sitreps, because they could not find many of the 
details they relied on to make decisions:  
“[I] don’t use [OCHA sitreps]. Issue of digestibility, issue 
of quality. I looked at the Country X sitrep, very nicely 
written, no use for me. Fine-tuned, very bland, for public 
consumption.... I may read it to know what will be coming 
at us from the media/press.” (Donor)  
If each audience for the sitrep was disappointed in the 
document, this begs the question: what was the sitrep good 
for? Many donors and NGOs valued the sitrep as an 
official, publicly citable source, representing what an 
OCHA interviewee defined the “humanitarian consensus”:  
“There’s usually a consensus on reliable data that emerges 
in the field. By the time it’s in an OCHA sitrep, it shouldn’t 
be new to anyone who’s reading it. It’s an excellent doc for 
gathering data from multiple agencies.” (Donor).  
The sitrep was also seen as critical for the purposes of 
circulating the shared understanding of humanitarian actors: 
“Things go better when there’s common information, a 
common viewpoint, even when it’s wrong” (Donor). We 
found that most recipients saw sitreps as ideally filling the 
role of a “one-stop shop,” “data point” or “overview,” but 
almost never a primary basis for decision-making. “On the 
basis of the situation reports that we have, we can decide 
that… at least we need more information” (UN Agency). 
However, because the sitrep was the consensus of the 
humanitarian actors, one senior manager at OCHA felt that,  
“From a historical perspective, that is something that is 
important, it’s a publication that sets the record, that 
certain things have been agreed upon. It’s a baseline for 
what was the situation at a certain time” (OCHA).  
While the sitrep was “bland” for most humanitarian actors 
to use for decision-making either in situ or farwaway, it 
represented the scaffolding on which humanitarian action 
could take place.  
2nd Challenge: The organization of OCHA  
Humanitarian organizations such as OCHA resemble many 
other corporate organizations where authority and resources 
reside at the “top,” the headquarters in New York and 
Geneva, while the knowledge about how to operate resides 
in the field [63]. We build upon the work of researchers 
who argue that information management in human-service 
organizations [17,18,61,69], development-oriented NGOs 
[32], and particularly humanitarian organizations [67] must 
be understood from a different perspective than that of 
traditional economic organizations. In the sparse literature 
focused on the use of information systems within 
humanitarian organizations, researchers have found that 
while humanitarian actors are accountable “upward” to 
donors and “downward” to beneficiaries, information 
technology-related projects are often focused on “upward 
accountability” only [65]. Similarly, in our work, the 
information technology project that we focused on, a new 
sitrep template, was driven by people in New York and 
Geneva. The needs of “headquarters” configured the work 
of the information laborers, at the cost of other parties. 
Senior officials at OCHA and the UN headquarters had to 
make difficult decisions about where to focus attention and 
funding.  
Sitrep authors were typically junior staff members, who 
were in the field when possible. Oftentimes this work 
would be closely supervised by OCHA country office 
directors. Generally, more senior information managers,  
usually located at headquarters, would edit the sitreps later. 
This “clearance” process embodied a complex negotiation 
between OCHA headquarters and the field. Although most 
of the people who worked in headquarters had experience 
working in the field, there remained a tense relationship 
between the perspective from the field and that at 
headquarters. Generally, people working at the site of the 
emergency thought that the sitrep document needed to meet 
the needs of that emergency, and since every emergency 
was different, they were content to issue sitreps when they 
thought it was appropriate in the format that best described 
the emergency. Sitrep creators in the field were closest to 
the emergency and generally understood what was 
happening, but were not always closest to the corridors of 
power where people decided whether and how to fund 
humanitarian disaster response.  The people who worked at 
headquarters were concerned about resource allocation 
across emergencies and relationships with international 
humanitarian organizations and donors. Often people who 
worked at headquarters wanted documents to comply with a 
specific format, so they were consistent across emergencies. 
People at headquarters thought that consistency would 
make the sitrep document easier for readers who had to 
look at documents about many emergencies, particularly 
donors and UN officials who needed to decide what to 
fund. Standardizing the sitreps would also allow OCHA to 
brand the organization and consistently communicate about 
disaster response, achieving their mandate. 
In our research, the difference between these perspectives 
was exemplified in debates over the headquarters dictating 
templates. In our role as project consultants, we were often 
working with a group at headquarters on developing 
templates for use globally. While these people were 
enthusiastic about templates, those in the “field” were not. 
The template was a locus where the procedures for making 
sitreps were being fought: 
“My experience with OCHA is that if they send you 
guidelines, then they consider them signed conventions! I’m 
weary of guidelines and templates, because they’re HQ-
driven, not for us in the field. When we develop them for 
ourselves, they are different.” (OCHA)  
OCHA field staff tended to value independence and 
flexibility instead:  
“It’s true, we resist standardization, because sometimes it 
lowers the quality of a good product to suit it to different 
audiences rather than your specific context” (OCHA).  
The standardization of information products walked a fine 
line between people in the field being able to adapt to a new 
emergency or innovate on existing information production 
practices, and the need to serve officials and donors who 
directed attention, resources and energy. OCHA relied on 
using different people in different parts of the organization 
to bring their perspective to the sitrep document. Different 
people had different understandings of the objectives of the 
sitrep, which were reflected in the final document. Along 
with issues of different audiences, and the challenge of 
making humanitarian information, the low status of 
information labor, and the hierarchical and distributed 
structure of OCHA made the document look “confused.” 
The last two challenges of sitrep production further 
elaborate on the context in which this information labor 
takes place. 
3rd Challenge: The status of sitrep work 
OCHA was mandated to do “information management” and 
be a “knowledge broker” in the humanitarian community. 
Yet, the work of information laborers like sitrep writers, 
was not well respected within the humanitarian community, 
even when resources were increasingly dedicated to the task 
of information management. More experienced officers 
were typically involved in more hands-on emergency work. 
Making information products, in contrast, was seen as 
unattractive work:  
“It is just not very sexy…. To be in the hottest emergency 
and you are not out there doing something in your Land 
Rover, you are behind your computer or on the phone with 
people trying to get information or visiting their offices or 
whatever, it’s just not the sexy part of the work.” (OCHA). 
Though sitreps were valued, the work of writing sitreps was 
not high status work in the world of humanitarian actors. 
The combination of sitrep writing as difficult and “not 
sexy” work is perhaps best captured by a sentence that we 
heard surprisingly often in the course of our research: 
sitreps are intended to “feed the beast at headquarters” 
(OCHA). An NGO interviewee described a sitrep in similar 
terms:  
“It’s one of the reasons why sitreps are like, ‘F***, I have 
to do a sitrep!’ Because the amount and the kind of 
information—it’s like a ravenous beast.” (NGO).  
During our interviews, we heard several variations on the 
concept: “We have to be able to feed the beast. We have to 
give talking points…” (OCHA); sitreps need to “get 
credible information out and use it for advocacy. They are 
feeding the internal machine” (OCHA). The idea of a beast 
fed by sitreps conveys well the feeling expressed by most of 
our interviewees: sitreps are a burden to put together, write, 
edit, distribute, and use; they are time‐consuming; they are 
always perceived to be useful to someone else, not to those 
who produce them; they require a lot of information. It is as 
if they were humanitarian workers’ Sisyphean task, where 
“…there’s an information beast here that needs to be fed 
all the time—but you can overfeed the beast, and the beast 
gets tired of it and doesn’t want any more.” (OCHA). Thus, 
while on one hand OCHA values information, or at least 
sees it central to its mission as a “knowledge broker,” on 
the other the people who are supposed to make the sitrep 
documents were not valued and did not want to do the 
work. Yet, the outcome of their work, documenting the 
humanitarian consensus, was of great value to the 
humanitarian community. The sitrep writers ambivalence 
towards their work on sitreps might have also reflected their 
ambivalence towards the logic of humanitarian action more 
broadly, which is discussed below in more detail. 
4th Challenge: The Logic of Humanitarian Action  
As many researchers have noted, humanitarian action relies 
on an “emergency imaginary” that “frames these events not 
as they look to locals, but as they appear to cosmopolitans” 
[11]. Sitreps are documents written by global humanitarian 
actors for other cosmopolitans.   
Highly debated amongst our interviewees was the question 
of the limits of what OCHA could include in sitreps, 
especially now that the internet has made their distribution 
and archiving much easier and more permanent, and 
therefore transformed what was originally an internal 
document into a highly visible one [48]:  
“The most difficult job doing the sitrep…. [is] not always 
putting the truth. You can’t say that the local government is 
not leading the response well, that they are not giving us 
access. I think that the donors should know. When people 
call me and ask me then I tell them the situation.” (OCHA) 
Sitrep creators felt that public sitreps could not report some 
details of humanitarian emergencies because the politically 
sensitive nature of these reports would offend another 
audience: the governments who were allowing 
humanitarian actors to do their work. Thus, the public 
nature of sitreps as a defining feature of the document, 
limited the accuracy of what the sitrep can describe [48]. 
Backchannels thus were important when it was not safe for 
humanitarian actors to publicly announce intervention 
plans. In these cases, sitreps may not represent the private 
“humanitarian consensus,” as described by this OCHA 
employee: 
“The insurgency group is reading the sitreps. Looking at 
the soft information that we are giving and they put out a 
press release threatening to blow up food deliveries….  We 
needed to get them [sitreps] out to the players that we 
needed to get them out to. There was a swath of information 
that would get everyone into trouble.” (OCHA) 
Thus, many OCHA staff felt that the sitrep is an incomplete 
document, because being involved in humanitarian action 
meant that often they could not be critical of groups who 
had the power to stop humanitarian intervention. UN 
Agencies and NGOs can only operate in emergencies if the 
country affected grants them permission. External 
humanitarian intervention is typically welcome only when 
the host country resources have been overwhelmed. Host 
countries or groups of people affected by a disaster might 
want the results of a disaster over-reported so that more aid 
comes into their country; others might want the results of a 
crisis under-reported in order to maintain sovereignty or 
punish the suffering. Sitreps might make it difficult for 
OCHA to operate in a country, if they anger the host 
government. But publishing a document that allows the 
organization to operate often means publishing a watered-
down document for public consumption, which might 
ultimately undermine the authority of OCHA. In some 
cases, the mere existence of a sitrep is problematic because 
it indicates the existence of an official emergency. One 
OCHA employee explained: “The information in the sitrep 
is not perturbing, the fact that there is a sitrep is the 
problem” (OCHA). The idea that OCHA did not clearly 
include information that would anger local authorities feeds 
into critiques of humanitarian action which argue that 
humanitarian aid can perpetuate or even worsen 
humanitarian crises by cooperating with a local government 
that could be bent on harming an ethnic minority or 
ignoring the plight of the poor. A UN agency interviewee 
said:  
“You have cases where the government is backing conflict, 
what do you do? In [a place], I’ve been negotiating ‘droit 
de passage’ [right of passage] with both government and 
rebels. Sometimes I’ve even been using the trucks of the 
army, which is explicitly forbidden…. It’s important to 
reach the beneficiaries.” (UN AGENCY) 
Interviewees sometimes called the kind of reporting that 
analyzed the activities of host governments or other groups 
“political analysis.” However, including “political analysis” 
in sitreps was problematic for their writers. A donor 
explained:  
“To what extent is OCHA mandated political analysis/ 
protection of civilians? … It would probably be dangerous 
for OCHA, but we would like to see them use the 
humanitarian lens. Recently, for weeks in [place omitted], 
the sitreps showed the numbers affected as 3000 but we had 
other figures showing 60000 but OCHA did not have an 
authorized re-assessment from the host government to 
correct the number.” (Donor).  
Donors with enough resources to get political analyses 
without OCHA were not interested in seeing OCHA’s, as 
they felt this was beyond its mandate, and not as useful as 
what they could get from their own sources:  
“I don’t think that we’re looking to OCHA for political 
analysis—they are the coordinating body for humanitarian 
effort, so we are looking for what are the conditions, what 
is the response—not policy or political issues. . . That’s not 
what our focus is, that’s not OCHA’s niche either.” 
(Donor).  
Conversely, some OCHA interviewees thought that it was 
difficult to credibly represent the realities of a crisis without 
some kind of “political analysis.” For sitrep writers, there 
was a difficult balancing act between practical 
considerations, institutional roles, and external 
expectations.  
5th Challenge: The difficulty of producing humanitarian 
information 
Disasters are dynamic and difficult to materialize into 
“information products” [39–41]. Describing complex 
humanitarian situations and the response in a concise way 
requires time, efforts, and resources to count people and 
understand their circumstances, and to put that information 
into an easily digestible form for multiple audiences. 
Among our interviewees, like in much academic literature, 
there was often an assumption that “information” simply 
exists out in the wild, to be plucked up into a sitrep or some 
other document [38]. In fact, all of the data in a sitrep was a 
result of laborious and complex work involving many 
people working for many organizations, reflecting that 
information as a concept and the artifacts which get called 
“information” [7] are constructed [6]. Furthermore, the 
ontological and epistemological process of counting things 
is not straightforward [37]. The process of making 
information something that can be fixed in a document and 
circulated is difficult [31]. The concept of “information” 
often hid the work that goes into making something like a 
sitrep. 
Furthermore, collecting any data about complex crises was 
very difficult. For example, OCHA Information Officers 
had to rely on experts from other NGOs and UN Agencies 
to get an idea of how many people might be affected by a 
famine. One of our interviewees, a field officer who worked 
on issues of security and population displacement, 
described being in touch on a weekly basis with over 70 
NGOs as well as other contacts on the ground in the 
country with a growing food security problem, and 
recording the data in a spreadsheet, in order to achieve an 
estimate of the number of people fleeing the area who were 
experiencing famine, and crossing international borders as 
refugees in a different country. As one interviewee put it, 
“Not everyone can be reduced to a spreadsheet; you need a 
narrative” (OCHA). On top of the data collected by the UN 
Agencies and NGOs, OCHA sitrep writers were expected to 
synthesize the different data points. All the work that this 
interviewee describes would be conveyed to OCHA in a 
highly summarized form, and be further summarized into 
perhaps a bullet point in the final sitrep, hiding all the work, 
uncertainties, and negotiations behind it. This not only loses 
all the nuance that is behind a description and that 
disappears in a number, but also hides the amount of work 
that takes place to collect even highly unsatisfactory data. 
The difficulty of gathering data can be exacerbated by the 
political motivations of sources. The following quote 
describes some of the challenges of understanding how 
many internally displaced people there were as a result of a 
flood. 
“We heard from one ethnic group and they said there was 
100,000 displaced. Then the other group said there was 
nothing and then changed their story. What we saw was a 
process of inflation about IDPs [internally displaced 
people]. People in NGOs had sophisticated models of 
counting IDPs. The government said there was 6,000 
[IDPs]. The range was 600,000 to 6,000. We tried to 
triangulate. We talked to village elders who lied. We wasted 
a lot of time in terms of resources. We couldn’t figure out 
who the beneficiary population should be.” (OCHA) 
As this OCHA staff makes clear, even a rough 
understanding of the size of the population in need is 
incredibly difficult to know because of the political context 
of humanitarian crises. 
6th Challenge: Competition and collaboration amongst 
humanitarian actors  
Traditional research on governance of complex 
informational environments is problematic when it is 
applied to humanitarian organizations because there is little 
recognition that multiple organizations must coordinate 
[33]. Furthermore, researchers have found that in this multi-
organization non-profit context, there is much concern 
about visibility to funders, and competition for resources 
[17,18,61].  
In the multi-organizational setting where OCHA operates, 
not only must the producers of sitreps take into account the 
intricacies of the organization that employs them, but also 
the fact that, as OCHA, they are not necessarily the 
organization that responds to disasters. OCHA is 
coordinating the hundreds of organizations that are 
involved. In the last decades, there has been a large increase 
in spending on humanitarian disaster response and a 
proliferation in organizations and workers involved with 
humanitarian disasters [3]. Increased financial resources 
directed towards humanitarian intervention have 
corresponded to an increase of people and material goods 
moving to an area with an emergency, as well as an 
emphasis on coordination, and accountability.  
Organizations like OCHA are in charge of coordinating all 
the actors, and have developed with the increases in 
humanitarian budgets and number of actors. Pre-disaster 
organization-spanning relationships are key to cross-
organizational information sharing in disaster response 
(Kapucu 2006).  Thus, producing a sitrep report requires 
excellent relationships with other humanitarian 
organizations. Most of the information in OCHA sitreps 
typically comes from NGOs and UN Agencies that are 
working directly with people affected by a disaster.  
A considerable obstacle to information sharing was that 
actors in the field were often in competition for funding, 
publicity, and resources. Collaboration required time, which 
many NGO staff members did not have, and drained 
resources needed for actual humanitarian action. It was also 
often perceived as a burden that would not get reciprocated, 
as the sitreps did not seem to provide enough new 
information to NGOs to make worth their time sharing their 
own data, as this informant explains: “Information should 
always be both ways, if it’s only one-way, I might do it for a 
while, then I’ll stop” (NGO). The sentiment was 
widespread among NGO informants, although some were 
more willing to recognize OCHA’s value: 
“If OCHA can provide good information, we’re happy to 
share our information. It’s getting something out of it. In a 
place like [name omitted] where the government had put in 
place very confusing regulations on NGOs, going to OCHA 
forums was really helpful because they would take on some 
of those issues, and work with the government to provide 
clearer regulations.” (NGO) 
The emergency relief environment is highly competitive, as 
different agencies and NGOs were competing for funding 
of their projects, and thus for visibility in sitreps. Sitreps are 
perceived as a vehicle for visibility:  
“(We get feedback) mainly from NGOs, because they want 
our sitreps to reflect their work… All acknowledge that it’s 
useful, but they complain that their work is not reflected on 
sitreps, and we reply that we’re happy to receive on a 
weekly basis information on what they do, but this never 
happens, nobody has the time for dedicated Information 
Officers to sit down and do that every week. Tricky 
situation, they complain and we tell them give us the 
information.” (OCHA). 
Some people who worked for NGOs agreed that visibility 
in a sitrep was important to them. “I always look for my 
own stuff, to see if [my agency] is there. If it is, then I look 
at who else is there; if not, then I call OCHA to complain,” 
(NGO). OCHA staff often highlighted how visibility is an 
incentive. As one employee said, “it is about being visible. 
Donors want to see them” (OCHA). But though NGOs and 
UN Agencies believed that it was important for them to 
gain visibility through the OCHA sitrep, donors did not 
agree:  
“Does it matter if an NGO is highlighted? Generally no—it 
means they have funding and can operate. We’re really 
looking at gaps. We might say, oh, this looks great, but we 
know about NGO reputations based on our own 
institutional experiences.” (Donor).  
Our document analysis showed that OCHA sitreps were 
heavily focused on UN agencies, giving the most visibility 
to these organizations and their activities. Donors 
confirmed this:  
“OCHA’s mandate is to pull it all together, but what we see 
is in fact a UN sitrep. UN agencies are big players in terms 
of funding, but even if they are not, OCHA sitreps seem to 
assume that the UN is the only player in a particular 
response. So they shortchange their mandate.” (Donor)  
Moreover, while organizations were sometimes eager to 
report on their action, they were not eager to talk about 
where they might be falling short. When asked what they 
were looking for in OCHA sitreps, our interviewees often 
answered “context.” By this many of the interviewees 
meant the needs of the local population, the response by 
local governments and the humanitarian community, and 
the unmet needs, referred to as the gap. The response-
needs-gap triad was, however, often missing for a variety of 
reasons, the most frequent being that the sitrep authors did 
not know what they were. The majority of our interviewees, 
including OCHA staff, expressed considerable frustration 
over the difficulty in providing context, as this was seen as 
the real value added that the organization could provide. As 
one donor explained, 
“What is frustrating is that they [OCHA] don’t put things 
in a context. [Sitreps say] this agency delivered this aid 
[with] no context. Most useful things—needs out there, this 
is provided, this is the gap—that’s what I feel people 
wanted to know. Now as a desk officer it’s like OK, but this 
doesn’t really say anything about the situation” (Donor). 
This was confirmed by our document analysis, which 
showed that every single sitrep featured details about the 
response that was being carried out, but rarely matched it to 
actual, reported gaps. Context also referred to the big 
picture of the crisis, but it was not straightforward what 
context OCHA could include, and what content would be 
read as OCHA overstepping its mandate of “coordination,” 
as we saw above in the 5th challenge. Thus, in an 
environment of competition for funding and visibility, 
sitrep authors had the complex role of arbiters of what went 
into the document that represented the humanitarian 
consensus on the emergency. A sitrep was often only going 
to be as good as the relationships that OCHA Information 
Officers had with UN Agencies, NGOs and other 
organizations working in the field. 
DISCUSSION 
Through our analysis, we highlighted the complexities of 
sitrep creators’ work, which helps explain how a document 
so vital could also be so “confused.”  
Downey suggests that there are three analytics for 
examining information labor that point us towards several 
conclusions. First, by focusing on information labor, 
researchers note “how human labor applied to information 
always takes place in, and depends on, a particular 
spatial/temporal and political-economic context” [23].  In 
order to write a sitrep, its creators need knowledge about 
complex organizational structures involved in disaster 
response, the economic imperatives of humanitarian 
organizations, interventionist logics, as well as the crisis 
itself. Notably, the sitreps represent the “humanitarian 
consensus,” as in “the consensus of international 
humanitarian actors,” not the consensus of those affected by 
a crisis. Thus, the work of sitrep production supports the 
logic of intervention where well-paid international workers 
come in to help “victims.” Social media holds the promise 
of broadcasting everyone’s voices, but the reality is often 
that those who are in the most need do not use the 
platforms, such as Twitter, that many humanitarians, digital 
and otherwise, listen to. Sitreps, as products of information 
labor, are inscribed with the political-economic context of 
humanitarian action. As we described above, their authors 
must rely on other organizations for details about a crisis. 
Humanitarian organizations compete with each other for 
funding, but also must cooperate with each other in 
responding to a crisis, and providing data for documents 
like sitreps. This environment incentivizes organizations to 
produce information that meets their needs either promoting 
their work or describing a situation so that they can get the 
resources they seek. Thus sitreps are not merely a document 
describing a disaster, but a platform for requesting funding. 
Other humanitarian actors may know how to read between 
the lines of a sitrep, but the general public may not.   
Second, analysts must attend to the social meaning of 
information labor as enabling and constraining the 
circulation of information [23]. Sitrep authors did not have 
high status amongst humanitarian workers, and devalued 
their own work. This shaped the quality of their work, as 
assessed by other humanitarian actors, because their status 
was reflected in their access to other organization and the 
information that they might be privy to. The status of sitrep 
work meant that the initial products of sitrep authors were 
edited before being circulated publicly. Furthermore, the 
low status of this kind of work makes it easy to 
underestimate the expertise involved in it. For example, 
describing the nutritional needs of a population of displaced 
people requires understanding local food customs, available 
cooking facilities, energy needs to support meal 
preparation, existing accessible food supplies, and the 
number of people to be served. Sitrep authors themselves 
might not have this expertise, but they often have access to 
it within their networks. While we are not against the 
efforts and expertise of “digital humanitarians,” and the 
positive impact this discourse might have on the status of 
“information labor,” attention to the expertise needed in 
humanitarian information production is also critical. 
Third, a focus on how the circulation of information shapes 
the information labor [23] shows that information laborers 
were constantly considering the many invited and uninvited 
audiences for sitrep documents. Sitrep authors hoped that 
the documents would persuade potential donors to fund 
humanitarian relief efforts. However, they also had to 
consider that sitreps might be read by governments or 
organizations involved in exacerbating the crises. Thus, 
they had to be sanitized, and facts left out. These 
incomplete sitreps sometimes compromised the standing of 
OCHA within the humanitarian community; on the other 
hand, its ability to deliver aid depended on its presence in, 
and even cooperation with, unscrupulous state actors. These 
compromises frustrated sitrep authors and other actors, and 
further highlight how the production of sitreps is imbued 
with the logic of humanitarian intervention. 
Using Downey’s information labor lens to consider 
humanitarian action, we argue that the environment of 
humanitarian action is reasserted many times throughout 
the sitrep creation process, and the  lens of “situated 
information labor” explains why the documents look so 
“fundamentally confused.” These documents reflect a 
fundamentally confused situation, with contradicting 
priorities and audiences, and a multitude of constraints. The 
information laborers embody these contradiction 
themselves. They do a job that is considered critical in 
theory, but undervalued and under-resourced in practice, 
and that is characterized by a series of misaligned 
incentives. Ultimately, the most significant contribution of 
our work as consultants has been to make visible the 
invisible work of sitrep writers, and to highlight how 
misaligned goals were often visible in the form and content 
of the document itself. As researchers, we emphasize how 
all humanitarian information must be read through its 
context of production (digital volunteers or OCHA 
employees alike), and that the processes behind it can shed 
light on the real priorities of the communities involved.   
CONCLUSION  
OCHA sitreps never met the expectations of those who 
made or those who read them—they were too short or too 
long, provided too little or too much detail, and omitted as 
much information as they provided. Still, people found 
them irreplaceable, even as they were expected to perform a 
variety of often incompatible roles, because they 
represented the humanitarian consensus on what was 
publicly citable. By analyzing the complexities of working 
in a humanitarian setting, we show that the information 
labor that goes into making sitreps can help us understand 
why sitreps are “fundamentally confused documents,” and 
why they are faithful representations of the complexity of 
humanitarian emergencies.  
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